Recent w,ell publicized attacks have made it clear that worms constitute a threat to Internet securip. Systems that secure networks against malicious code are expected to be a parr of critical Internet infrastructure in the future. Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) currently have limited use because they can filter only known worms. In this paper; we present the design and implementation of a system that automatically detects new worms in real-time by monitoring traffic on a network. The system uses Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) to scan packets for patterns of similar content. Given that a new worm hits the network and the rate of infection is high, the system is automatically able to detect an outbreak. Frequently occuring strings in packet payloads are instantly reported as likely worm signatures.
Introduction
Internet worms work by exploiting vulnerabilities in operating systems and application software that run on end systems. The attacks compromise security and degrade network performance. They cause large economic losses for businesses resulting from system down-time and loss of worker productivity. Several approaches to defend against worms are described in [I]:
. Prevention ; Worms usually work by exploiting vulnerabilities in software. Prevention involves writing secure code. Much work has been done by the Language Security community towards achieving this goal.
-Treatment : Programmers analyze the vulnerability that the worm exploits and release a "patch" that fixes it. However, it takes time to analyze and patch software. In addition, many end users may never apply the patch. As a result, a significant fraction of machines in the network remain vulnerable.
. Host-based containment systems ; An example of host-based defense would be one that restricts the nnmher of active connections. This would restrict the number of worm "probes" that hit other vulnerable machines on the Internet. A problem with host-based defense is that it is not easy to deploy. It requires that a privileged process be run and maintained on every end system in the network.
. Containment by the network : The advantage of using network based containment is that a small number of IDPSs can protect an entire corporate or university department network. Current intrusion detection systems use signatures to detect only known worms. Hence the network is left vulnerable to unknown worms. This paper focusses on the design and implementation of a containment system that protects the network against unknown worms. Design goals of the system include:
Low reaction time : The system should detect anomalies quickly and begin blocking malicious data flows so that damage caused by the worm can be limited. High throughput : Systems must keep up with today's high speed links, like Gigabit Ethernet and OC-48, in order to monitor all traffic in real-time. Softwarebased systems can perform only a limited number of operations within the time period of a packet transmission. This necessitates the use of hardware.
. Low cost : The system should fit within the limits afforded by today's FF'GAs and ASICs.
. Low false positive rate : The system must generate a minimum number of false positives. Otherwise, warnings will be ignored and/or legitimate traffic will be blocked. Robust to simple countermeasures ; The system should have the ability to detect polymorphic worms that work by inserting no-ops and random code in the worm payload.
Our system .is designed to work in tandem with an IDPS such as the one presented in 
Related Work
The authors of [3] show why worms are a major threat to security. They model the spread of a worm with the susceptibles/infectives (SI) model. They also describe techniques that could he used by worm authors to improve the effectiveness of their code. Many worms today spread by random probing. The authors propose "hit-list scanning" wherein the worm author decides on a list of vulnerable machines before deciding to attack.
In [I] the requirements of a system such as the one presented in this paper are examined. The authors simulate the spread of a worm and examine the relative effectiveness of two approaches in containing spread. One approach is address blacklisting and another is content scanning and filtering (our approach). Their results demonstrate content filtering to be superior to address blacklisting, and highlight the need for a system capable of real-time worm detection.
The EarlyBird System 141 outlines the design of a system that detects unknown worms in real time. The system uses three criteria to flag a virus:
I ) The authors of [7] use a data structure similar to ours to infer flow size distribution. Their method involves calculating the number of partitions of different counter vaiues which is known to be a computationally intensive problem.
They are aided by the fact that the distribution of flow sizes is Zipfian (a small number of flows consume most of the bandwidth). However, we are not at liberty of making assumptions about fixed length keyword distributions in random traffic. Hence, we believe that their methods are not applicable to our problem owing to their computational infeasibility.
. .
Overview of System
This system draws from two ideas presented in the EarlyBird system: (1) A worm detection system should look for frequently occuring content (2) It should be resistant to polymorphic techniques employed by worm authors. The contribution of our work lies in providing the detailed design of a system that has been implemented to run in hardware at high speed. A functional block diagram of the system is shown in Figure 2 . The functionality of the blocks in the figure is explained in the following sections.
A. Hash
To detect commonly occuring content, we calculate a k-bit hash over a IO byte (80 bit) window of streaming data. In order to compute the hash, we generate a set k x 80 random binary values at the time the system is 
B. Count Vector
The hash value is used to index into a vector of counters.
When a signature hashes to a counter, it results in the counter being incremented by one. At periodic intervals (henceforth called timeouts), the counts in each of the vectors are decremented by the average number of arrivals due to normal traffic. When a counter reaches a predetermined threshold, an alert is generated and its value is reset to zero. For the implementation of the circuit on a Xilinx FPGA, the count vector is implemented by configuring dualported, on-chip block RAMS as an array of memory locations. Each of the memories can afford one read operation and one write operation every clock cycle. This allows us to implement a 3-stage pipeline to read, increment and write memory every clock cycle. Since the signature changes every clock cycle and every occurence of every signature needs to be counted, the dual-ported memories allow us to write back the number of occurences of one signature while another is being read.
C. Character Filter
A character filter allows selected characters to he excluded from the hash computation. It ignores characters that are known to be innocuous, such as nulls, line breaks and new lines in text streams. To pre-process entire strings, a stream editor can be used to search for regular expressions and replace them with strings, as presented in NI.
D. SRAM Analyzer
A ShXM analyzer holds suspicious signatures and estimates how often a certain signature has occured. When an on-chip counter crosses the threshold, we hash the corresponding signature to a table in off-chip SRAM. The next time the same string causes the counter to exceed the threshold, we hash to the same location in SRAM and compare the two strings. If the two strings are the same, we know that it is not a false positive ,and we increment a counter in SRAM. If the two strings are different, we perform an overwrite of the SRAM location to reset the count and store the other string. By tracking the number of times specific signatures are matched, the hardware greatly reduces the number of false positives reported.
E. Alert Generator
On receiving confirmation from the SRAM analyzer that a signature is indeed frequently occuring, a User Datagram Protocol (UDP) control packet is sent to an external PC that is listening on a well known port. The packet will contain the offending signature which is the string of bytes over which the hash was computed. The most frequently occuring strings are then flagged as being suspicious.
F. Periodic Subtraction of Time Averages
There are two approaches to handle timeouts. One approach as mentioned in [5] resets the counters periodically.
After a fixed window of bytes pass through the link, all of the counters are reset by writing the values to zero. However, this approach has a shortcoming which is illustrated in Figure 3 . If the value of a counter corresponding to a malicious signature (labeled M in the figure) is just below the threshold at the time near the end of the timeout period, then reseting this counter will result in the signature going undetected. 
Fig. 4. Minimizing contention by segmenting count vectors into smaller memories
An alternative to resetting the counters is to periodically subtract an average value from all the counters. The average value is computed as the expected number of bytes that would hash to the bucket in each interval. Our simulations show that using periodic subtraction rather than counter reset provided a dramatic increase in the number of signatures found.
IV. Design Considerations
So far, we have covered the major aspects of the system's design. In this section, we detail how certain common and edge casesare accomodated in our design.
A. Maintaining Throughput
In Figure 2 , the system that was shown processes one byte at a time. To achieve higher throughput, multiple strings can be processed in each clock cycle. By augmenting the system with multiple parallel count vectors, multiple windows of bytes can be scanned in parallel. To get an accurate count of how often a signature has occured, a sum of the corresponding counters in all count vectors needs to be computed in every clock cycle. Therefore, multiple reads are required out of the memory of each count vector every clock cycle.
To allow multiple memory operations to be performed in parallel, we segment the count vectors into multiple hanks (Block RAMS). The higher order bits of the hash value are used to determine which Block RAM to access. The lower bits are used to determine which counter 10 increment within a given Block RAM. The modified system is shown in Figure 4 . It is possible that more than one string could hash to the same Block RAM (MI through M, in the figure). We call this situation a bank collision. A bank collision is resolved using a priority encoder (PE1 through PE, in the figure) . This means that between 1 and 3 strings may not be counted every clock cycle for a system that runs at OC-48 line rates. The probability of collision, c, is given by :
Where N is the number of Block RAMS used and B is the number of bytes coming in every clock cycle. We examine the impact of bank collisions on the reliability of the system in Section V.
B. Benign Strings
Certain strings such as the first several bytes of a H T P request are commonly occuring strings but are not themselves a worm or virus. The system administrator can mark certain strings as being benign. A counter corresponding to a benign string is populated with a value beyond threshold. When a counter has this value, the circuit skips the increment and write back steps.
C. Dealing with False Positives
We have considered how an adversary may try to overwhelm the system with false positives. One way to do this would be to send packets with the same string repeated multiple times. Another related approach would be to repeat the same string across multiple closely spaced packets. We address this problem with a window based scheme for counting signatures. If the window size is T, then signatures are counted only once in T bytes. This approach handles the trivial case of repeating strings within the same packet as well as an attacker sending several closely spaced packets with the same string. This scheme can be implemented by using a Bloom filter [9] .
A Bloom filter is a data structure which can store a set of signatures compactly and can handle membership queries on these signatures. It has a zero false negative probability and a quantifiable false positive probability.
The false positive probability, f of a Bloom filter is 
where n is the number of signatures, k is the number of hash functions used and m is the length of the Bloom filter in bits.
The basic idea is to maintain two Bloom filters. For each incoming signature, a Bloom filter is queried to see if that signature has been counted before. If not, then the Bloom filter is programmed with that signature and the counter corresponding to that signature is incremented. At the end of the window of T bytes, we switch to the other Bloom filter to process the next window while we reset the one that is currently in use. From Equation 2 it is clear that the false positive probability increases with the number of signatures. We dimension the Bloom filter and T such that the maximum false positive probability is acceptably low.
For j=O.OOl and m=40960 hits ( I O Block RAMS), we have T=2848 (which exceeds the minimum packet length).
Each hash query and each programming action corresponds to two memory accesses in the m-bit long array. Thus for 10 hash functions, the Bloom filter memory should be able to support a maximum of 20 memory accesses per clock cycle. Such access capacity is achieved by using dual-ported on-chip memories as shown in Figure 5 . Note that a traditional Bloom filter is a continguous block of m bits. It is shown in [IO] that this configuration does not affect the false positive probability.
D. The Relationship Between Threshold and Timeout
Since the timeout is approximately equal to the number of signatures that we see, the problem of determining threshold, given timeout reduces to a well studied problem in hashing. Namely -if m elements are hashed to a table with b buckets, the probability that the number of elements c hashing to the same bucket exceeds i i s given by [ l I]:
In our case, m signatures are hashed to b counters. In the above equation, c i s the count of any given counter and i is the threshold. Hence, given a value of timeout, we can vary the threshold to make the upper bound on the probability of a counter exceeding the threshold acceptably small. This in turn reduces the number of unnecessary SRAM accesses. The idea is that since incoming signatures bash randomly to the counters, anomalous signatures are likely to cause counters to exceed threshold for appropriately large thresholds.
We used the traces mentioned in Section V to simulate the system and check how well Equation 3 predicts the rate of SRAM accesses. General trends showed the number of unnecessary SRAM accesses to decrease with increasing threshold and decreasing timeout. But given Equation 3, one would expect a drastic drop in the number of SRAM accesses beyond a certain threshold. However, this was not the case in our simulation. It was found that the FTF' traces contained recurring data and were not truly random. We expect that if the benign strings found in the traces were programmed into the system, then the number of SRAM accesses would follow the trend predicted by Equation 3 more closely.
V. Performance Evaluation
We examine the resilience of the system to various worm attacks and the effect of memory hank conflicts on the system.
A. Simulation Setup
Traces found in 1121 were used to provide realistic background traffic for simulations. They contain all anonymous FTP connections to public FTP servers at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory during a 10 day interval.
Each of the traces spans a day. The methods used to anonymize the traces can be found in [13]. Two of the traces were concatenated and the following changes were made to them:
. Header information was stripped off and only packet payloads were preserved since only they are of interest. Packet boundaries were preserved. Synthetic worm signatures of lengths ranging from 500 to 5oooO bytes were inserted randomly along packet boundaries in the trace data to constitute a fixed percentage of the overall traffic.
The simulation in the following suh-section also utilizes random traffic. Counters were incremented at random. A "worm" was introduced by incrementing a pre-determined set of counters deterministically. In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the system against various worm attacks. Since the system relies on a counter exceeding a threshold before it issues an alert, the more the occurences of the signature, the better the chances of it being detected by the system. This means that there is an inverse relationship between The size of the worm and the sensitivity of the system to stealth. This idea is best illustrated with an example. .Consider two worms of sizes 500 bytes and 10.000 bytes. In both cases, the worms would have to pass through the system a fixed number of times before being detected. But given the difference is sizes between the two worms, the concentration of the smaller worm in the Internet traffic will be far less than that of the larger worm. Worms vary widely in size from a few hundred bytes (SQL Slammer) to thousands of bytes (Sasser). Hence we have considered the robustness of the system to various worm sizes. The minimum required percentage for detection is taken to be a metric for effectiveness of the system.
The results are shown in Table I . The system is quite effective at detecting smaller worms at an early stage. But detecting larger worms becomes a much harder task. It is easy to see why this is the case. If the size of the worm exceeds the number .of counters, the worm will cause all the counters to increment each time it passes (assuming the worm itself is sufficiently random). In this case, it will. be indistinguishable from normal data. The results for trace data are better than for random data owing to the fact that there is regularity in real traffic.
C. Impact of Bank Collisions
Results of this simulation answers the question of how much on-chip memory is needed in order to keep the number of collisions at an acceptable level. With the value of B in Equation 1 taken to he 4, the theoretical and empirical probability of collisions are shown for 4, 8, 16 , 32 and M Block RAMs. The empirical probability. of collision tums out to be much lower than'the theoretical probability for large amounts of Block RAM. For instance, the theoretical probability of collision with 64 Block RAMs (256 MBits) is 0.09. But the empirical probability is.only 0.02. Therefore, we conclude that with sufficiently high amounts of Block RAM the collision rate can be kept low. The disparity between the empirical and theoretical probabilities can be explained by the fact that we assume perfectly random data while calculating theoretical probability. However, as mentioned previously the trace data is not random.
VI. Functional Prototype
The circuit discussed in this paper has been targeted to run on the FPX platform [14] . The Field-programmable Port Extender (FPX) provides for the processing of high speed network flows with large FPGAs. Application circuits can be downloaded to the Xilinx XCV200OE FPGA on the FPX card for processing of high speed network flows. Network trafiic is clocked into this device using a 32-bit-wide data word. The circuit has been designed to fit into the layered protocol wrappers [IS] . Read, Increment and Write Back : Each of these steps can be achieved in 1 clock cycle. The address and data buses of the block RAMS are accessed based on the output of the priority encoder. A functional prototype of the system that can process traffic at full line rate has been implemented on the FF'X as proof of concept. The circuit runs at a frequency of 91.5 MHz. Utilization statistics of the FPGA can be seen in Table 11 . As can be seen, the circuit fits well within the resources afforded by contemporary P G A logic. The speed at which the circuit operates allows processing at OC-48 line speeds on the FF'X platform. The circuit has a pipeline delay of 7 clock cycles which introduces a delay of 70 ns in the datapath. Each of the modules outlined above has a 1 clock cycle delay. This implies that the system is capable to detecting and responding to worms in real-time.
VII. Conclusions
The design of a system for detecting frequently occuring signatures in network traffic has been presented. We showed in Seclion 4 that the system is capable of scaling to very high throughputs. Since we exploit the parallelism afforded by hardware, the system is able to scan a far larger amount of traffic than software based approaches. Throughput was improved by hashing several windows of bytes in parallel to on chip memories. Each of these memories can be updated in parallel. In software, the hash followed by a counter update will require several instructions executed sequentially. The relationship between timeout and threshold in combination with the SRAM analyzer ensures a low false positive rate.
Current network monitoring tools rely on the system administrator's intuition to detect anomalies in network traffic. We believe that our system takes the process a step closer to automation by automatically detecting that a spike in network traffic corresponds to frequently occuring content.
